000 01290nab|a22002657a|4500
001 65246
003 MX-TxCIM
005 20220720204101.0
008 22050221985|||m-us||p|op||||00||0|eengdd
022 _a0008-4085
022 _a1540-5982 (Online)
024 _2https://doi.org/10.2307/135091
040 _aMX-TxCIM
041 _aeng
100 1 _aHarris, R.
_927296
245 1 4 _aWhy Voluntary Export Restraints Are 'Voluntary'
260 _bWiley-Blackwell,
_c1985.
_aUSA :
520 _aThe paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint (VER) upon an importing firm. A VER set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry. The result follows as the imposition of a VER upon a free trade Nash price competition, forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader. The VER raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare.
546 _aText in English
650 7 _2AGROVOC
_91093
_aEconomics
650 7 _2AGROVOC
_91088
_aEconomic analysis
650 7 _911109
_aExports
_2AGROVOC
773 _dUSA : Wiley-Blackwell, 1985.
_gvol. 18, no 4, p. 799-809
_tCanadian Journal of Economics
_x0008-4085
942 _cJA
_n0
_2ddc
999 _c65246
_d65238