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999			_c60863 _d60855
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003			MX-TxCIM
005			20190917221514.0
008			190828s2019||||ne |||p|op||||00||0|eng|d
022			_a0304-3878
024	8		_ahttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.06.006
040			_aMX-TxCIM
041			_aeng
100	1		_aBelissa, T. _910441
245	1	0	_aLiquidity constraints, informal institutions, and the adoption of weather insurance : _ba randomized controlled Trial in Ethiopia
260			_aAmsterdam (Netherlands) : _bElsevier, _c2019.
500			_aPeer review
520			_aWe report the results of a drought insurance experiment in Ethiopia, and examine whether uptake of index-based insurance is enhanced if we allow farmers to pay after harvest (addressing a liquidity constraint). We also test to what extent uptake can be enhanced by promoting insurance via informal risk-sharing institutions (Iddirs), to reduce trust and information problems. The delayed payment insurance product increases uptake substantially when compared to standard insurance, from 8% to 24%, and leveraging informal institutions results in even greater uptake (43%). We also find suggestive evidence that the delayed premium product is indeed better at targeting the liquidity constrained. However, default rates associated with delayed payments are relatively high and concentrated in a small number of Iddirs - potentially compromising the economic viability of the novel product. We discuss how default rates can be reduced.
536			_aWe would like to thank ESRC/DFID (ES/N013344/1 “Delivering Inclusive Financial Development and Growth”), 3ie (TW13.1014) and CIMMYT (CGIAR Research Program on Maize) for financial support.
546			_aText in English
650		7	_aAgricultural insurance _2AGROVOC _96255
650		7	_aLiquidity _2AGROVOC _910442
651		7	_2AGROVOC _92025 _aEthiopia
700	1		_aBulte, E. _910443
700	1		_aCecchi, F. _910444
700	1		_aGangopadhyay, S. _910445
700	1		_aLensink, R. _910446
773	0		_gv. 140, p. 269-278 _dAmsterdam (Netherlands) : Elsevier, 2019. _x0304-3878 _tJournal of Development Economics _w445724
942			_cJA _n0 _2ddc