Peer review

Arranging an adequate governance structure is critical to the success of equity joint ventures. However, a joint venture that is operating under an asymmetric structure between the equity share and operational control is frequently observed in developing countries. The purpose of this research is to systematically explore the contingencies under which an asymmetric governance structure is likely to occur and whether it is associated with a performance difference vis-à-vis symmetric cases, an issue that receives scant attention in the literature. Based on a survey database containing around 700 Sino–foreign joint ventures, we find that the occurrence of an asymmetric governance structure is significantly associated with the differential resource contributions between collaborative partners and the vertical structural linkage between the foreign partner and the venture. More importantly, international joint ventures (IJVs) operating under an asymmetric governance structure reveal no significant profitability difference compared to those operating under a symmetric structure. Suggestions and implications concerning the use of negotiation flexibility for joint venture partners in their pursuit of collaborative goals are discussed.

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